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Abstract—This paper is concerned with a binary detection
problem over a non-secure network. To satisfy the communication
rate constraint and against possible cyber attacks, which are
modeled as deceptive signals injected to the network, a likelihood
ratio based (LRB) scheduler is designed in the sensor side to
smartly select sensor measurements for transmission. By explor-
ing the scheduler, some sensor measurements are successfully
retrieved from the attacked data at the decision center. We
show that even under a moderate communication rate constraint
of secure networks, an optimal LRB scheduler can achieve a
comparable asymptotic detection performance to the standard
N-P test using the full set of measurements, and is strictly
better than the random scheduler. For non-secure networks,
the LRB scheduler can also maintain the detection functionality
but suffers graceful performance degradation under different
attack intensities. Finally, we perform simulations to validate
our theoretical results.
Index Terms—Binary detection, cyber attack, sensor scheduler,
scheduled transmission rate, asymptotic detection performance.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) are intelligent systems which
are typically networked systems for interactions between phys-
ical processes and computing components. Computation and
communication capabilities are deeply embedded in CPS to
help detect, monitor and control physical entities in phys-
ical system remotely in a cooperative way. Examples of
CPS include intelligent transportation systems, environmental
monitoring networks, power distribution networks, healthcare
monitoring systems, wireless sensor networks (WSNs) and etc.
These applications are generally safety-critical since system
failures due to malicious cyber attacks can result in disastrous
breakdown to infrastructures’ functionality and irreversible
harm to human safety.
Distributed detection [1] in WSNs plays an important role
in network monitoring. A typical distributed detection sensing
system consists of a decision center, a wireless communication
link and a group of sensor nodes, which are deployed in
the interested area for data collection. WSNs are usually
deployed in public or adversarial environment over non-secure
channels [2], [3], under various potential cyber attacks such as
jamming [4], selective forwarding [5], message manipulation
[6], false data injection [7] and routing attacks [8]. These
attacks can induce deceptive false alarms in detection and
lead to misjudging of the system state changes. For instance,
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Fig. 1. Distributed detection framework under attack
an intruder may fabricate an equipment breakdown event in
a process industry by sending deliberately forged signals to
the detection center. Considerable economic loss will occur
if the ongoing production process are terminated due to the
non-existing equipment breakdown. To protect the system, se-
cure communication mechanisms and technologies are highly
desired.
Previous research concerning security issues in WSNs
mainly focus on information authentication [9], [10], key
encryption [11], [12], data aggregation [13], [14], and secure
routing [15], [16]. These security measures are generally
designed to defend against malicious attacks by preventing
deceptive data sent or received by the sensors, controllers
and actuators, while the survivability under attacks is rarely
discussed. In practice, however, the defense mechanisms can
often fail due to various unpredictable problems such as
human errors, design defects, incorrect operations, and device
misconfigurations. This indicates that attacks may not be
resolved even when defense technology is employed in the
system. As Cardenas et al pointed out in [17], it is highly
desirable that the system proceed to function well or degrade
gracefully even under attacks.
In this work, we consider a detection framework in Fig.
1 where the system and the remote tester are connected by
a non-secure network. In particular, an attacker will inject a
deceptive signal qi into the channel. If the measurement yi
is directly sent to the tester, the attacker renders it difficult
for the tester to distinguish from the deceptive signal to make
a correct decision. To solve it, we propose a communication
scheduler in the transmitter side whose state is denoted by
γi. For example, γi = 0 corresponds to that yi will not be
transmitted to the tester while γi = 1 indicates that yi will be
sent to the tester. The purpose of such a scheduler is twofold.
Firstly, the binary-valued γi of the scheduler can be securely
encrypted, and provides critical information for the tester to
survive the ongoing cyber attack. Secondly, it helps to select
“useful” measurements for transmission, and discard the rest
of “non-useful” ones. From this perspective, the scheduler
reduces the energy consumption for sensors as only a subset
of the sensor measurements will be transmitted to the tester.
Observe that the likelihood ratio of sensor measurements
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2is key to the celebrated Neyman-Pearson (N-P) test, which is
known to be an optimal test for the binary hypothesis testing
problem under a full set of measurements [18]. This suggests
that the likelihood ratio might be a good candidate to quantify
the importance of a sensor measurement. To pursue this idea,
we propose a likelihood ratio based (LRB) communication
scheduler for a binary hypothesis testing problem. Specifically,
only the sensor measurement with its likelihood ratio far from
one will be useful for the detection problem and sent to the
tester while the rest are deemed as non-useful.
Note that the tester will receive the transmitted measure-
ments with the securely encrypted scheduler state γi and
possible deceptive signals. By exploring their relationships,
the tester can extract certain critical information for detection.
Without cyber attacks, scheduled transmission rate is intro-
duced in [19] to quantify the reduction of communication
cost by the scheduler, which is defined as the ratio of the
number of transmitted measurements to the total number of
sensor measurements in the average sense. Intuitively, the
larger the scheduled transmitted rate, the larger the number of
sensor measurements tends to be transmitted in a fixed time
interval. Due to possible cyber attacks, a larger transmission
rate does not always result in a better detection performance
as it may also reduce the chance for the tester to discriminate
the transmitted true measurements from the deceptive signals.
We are therefore interested in the design of an optimal LRB
scheduler to achieve a good detection performance under
an appropriate transmission rate. Since the scheduler is a
nonlinear function of sensor measurements, it is challenging
to design an (asymptotically) optimal LRB scheduler for
detection.
Under a LRB scheduler, which is to be specified later,
we explicitly derive the rejection regions of the null hy-
pothesis respectively under N-P tests. Due to nonlinearity of
the scheduler, it is impossible to analytically calculate the
probabilities of either Type I or II errors. Thus, we resort
to the asymptotic approach to quantify the effect of the
scheduler on the detection performance, and obtain optimal
schedulers. Note that sensor data scheduling has been reported
in [20]–[24] for detection problems and in [19], [25]–[27]
for state estimation problems, while none of these works
consider security issues. Besides, they focus on establishing an
optimal transmission strategy under different scenarios while
the effect of sensor scheduling mechanism on the detection
performance remains unexploited. In comparison, we conduct
an asymptotic analysis as the number of sensor measurements
tends to infinity. This enables us to clearly quantify how the
scheduled transmission rate and the potential deceptive data
degrades the asymptotic detection performance.
The contribution of this work can be summarized as follows.
Firstly, inspired by the feature of an N-P test, we propose an
LRB communication scheduler to reduce the communication
cost for a binary detection problem, which is shown to be an
efficient and simple strategy both in theory and simulation.
Secondly, under a scheduled transmission rate constraint, an
asymptotically optimal LRB scheduler is designed to achieve
the fastest exponential convergence of detection error. Thirdly,
using the scheduler information, we introduce tester signal
processing protocols to maintain detection functionality even
when deceptive attack signal are injected in the channel. In
addition, the degradation of detection performance under a
certain attack intensity is explicitly quantified in the asymp-
totical sense.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we formulate the distributed detection problem
and propose the LRB scheduler. In Section III, we explicitly
develop the Neyman-Pearson test and conduct asymptotic
performance analysis for the LRB scheduler. Section IV in-
troduces signal processing protocols at the tester when cyber
attack happens. Asymptotic analysis are conducted to exactly
quantify performance degradation of detection under different
attack intensities. In Section V, simulation results are included
to validate our theoretical results. In Section VI, we draw
some concluding remarks and highlight some future research
directions.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Distributed detection through WSNs is threatened by po-
tential cyber attacks, but works under friendly communication
environment in the majority of time. We are particularly
interested in designing a secure detection system that performs
well under malicious environment.
A. Communication Scheduler for Secure Detection
Consider a scenario that a remote sensor is deployed to
monitor a phenomenon of physical interest, which is modeled
as a binary state of the nature. The sensor collects samples
from the system and transmits them to a decision center
through a non-secure network. In this paper, the sensing signal
is given by
yi = θ + vi, i = 1, 2, . . . , (1)
where the system state is represented by a binary-valued θ ∈
{θ0, θ1} ⊂ R, and vi is a white Gaussian noise with variance
σ2. It is obvious that it does not lose generality by letting
θ0 < θ1.
The task of the decision center is to discriminate between
the two states using its received sensing information. To
this purpose, a tester is implemented to solve the following
hypothesis testing problem:
H0 : {θ = θ0} versus H1 : {θ = θ1}. (2)
In statistics, H0 is called the null hypothesis and H1 is the
alternative hypothesis. Throughout the paper, all the random
varibles/vectors are defined on a common probability space
(Ω,F , Pθ). In contrast to the conventional hypothesis testing
problem [18], we focus on a distributed framework consisting
of a communication scheduler, which is embedded in the
sensor side, a remote tester and a non-secure channel, see Fig.
1 for an illustration. In particular, let γi = 1 indicate that the
sensor is triggered to transmit yi to the tester at sampling
time i and the packet containing the information of yi is
perfectly delivered to the tester while γi = 0 means that there
is no data transmission between the sensor and the tester. That
is, the scheduler will decide whether yi is to be transmitted
3or not. A natural question is how to design an efficient and
easily implementable scheduler to achieve a good detection
performance, even under the potential cyber attacks.
As in [28], we do not consider other communication issues
such as packet losses, transmission delay, data quantization,
channel noise and etc. This implies that if there is no mea-
surement sent from the sensor at time i, the tester does not
receive anything from the channel and understands that yi is
censored. Hence, the information received by the tester at time
i is given by
zi = {γiyi, γi, qi}. (3)
For noisy channels, the binary-valued γi can be available
to the tester by sending merely one bit message from the
sensor node. It should be noted that in light of [19] the main
approach of this work can be generalized to address some
channel medium effects, although we do not plan to do so for
brevity.
Given an arbitrary scheduler {γi}, we adopt the so-called
scheduled transmission rate [19] to roughly evaluate the
average communication cost at time N as follows
Rθ =
1
N
N∑
i=1
Eθ[γi], (4)
where the mathematical expectation Eθ[·] is taken with respect
to the probability measure Pθ. Intuitively, Rθ characterizes the
frequency of measurement transmission in the average sense.
Obviously, a larger scheduled transmission rate corresponds to
a higher ratio of the number of transmitted measurements to
the total number of sensor measurements.
Under the above detection framework, the objective of this
work is as follows.
1) Given a scheduled transmission rate constraint, design an
efficient and practical scheduler in the sense of achieving
a good detection performance.
2) Design tester signal processing protocols to maintain
system functionality when deceptive signals are injected
into the system.
3) Exactly quantify the effect of the scheduler and different
attack intensities on the asymptotic detection perfor-
mance.
B. LRB Scheduler
Given a full set of sensor measurements y = {y1, . . . , yN},
recall that the rejection region for the null hypothesis of the
standard Neyman-Pearson (N-P) test for a binary detection
problem is expressed by
{y : f(y|θ1) > kf(y|θ0)}, (5)
where f(y|θj) denotes the joint probability density function
(pdf) of y with respect to θ ∈ {θ0, θ1} and k is a decision
threshold. It is well known that the N-P test is a uniformly
most powerful test for the detection problem (2) under the
full set of measurements y.
Since yi is a sequence of independently and identically
distributed (i.i.d.) Gaussian random variables, the rejection
region in (5) can be explicitly expressed as{
y :
N∏
i=1
pθ1(yi)
pθ0(yi)
> k
}
, (6)
where pθ(yi) = N (yi; θ, σ2) and N (yi; θ, σ2) is the pdf of a
Gaussian random variable with mean θ and variance σ2.
As the rejection decision is mainly decided by the likelihood
ratio, we resort to the likelihood ratio function to quantify the
importance of a sensor measurement as follows
g(y|θ0, θ1) = pθ1(y)
pθ0(y)
. (7)
In fact, if g(yi|θ0, θ1) is far from one, the measurement
yi will lead to a significant change of the likelihood ratio,
and eventually affects the tester decision. Thus, we expect
that yi associated with a likelihood ratio far from one may
contain useful information for detection, and a measurement
with its likelihood ratio close to one is regarded as non-useful
or uninformative.
Taking advantage of the above observation and noting that
yi is an i.i.d. random sequence, we propose a likelihood ratio
based (LRB) scheduler of the following form:
γi =
{
0, if 1/α < g(yi|θ0, θ1) < α;
1, otherwise, (8)
where the scheduling parameter α > 1 and is to be designed.
Informally speaking, the scheduler helps the sensor to smartly
decide whether a sensor measurement is useful or not. To
reduce the number of sensor communication, only useful
measurements will be transmitted to the tester through a non-
secure network and discard the rest of measurements.
The LRB scheduler can be further simplified. For instance,
let the parameters a and b satisfy that
g(a|θ0, θ1) = 1
α
and g(b|θ0, θ1) = α. (9)
It follows that
1 =
1
α
· α = g(a|θ0, θ1) · g(b|θ0, θ1)
= exp([(θ1 − θ0)/σ2] · [a+ b− (θ0 + θ1)]),
which implies that
a+ b = θ0 + θ1. (10)
We also notice that
g(y|θ0, θ1) = pθ1(y)
pθ0(y)
=
exp(−(y − θ1)2/2σ2)
exp(−(y − θ0)2/2σ2)
= exp(y(θ1 − θ0)/σ2)exp((θ20 − θ21)/2σ2).
It is clear that g(y|θ0, θ1) is an increasing function in y. Thus
the LRB scheduler in (8) can be explicitly rewritten as follows
γi =
{
0, if a < yi < b;
1, otherwise, (11)
where a < b and a+b = θ0+θ1. See Fig. 2 for an illustration,
which indicates that yi close to the center of θ0 and θ1 is not
useful for the detection problem. This is consistent with our
intuition as it is usually difficult to discriminate whether yi is
4sampled under H0 or H1 when yi is close to the center of θ0
and θ1. From this point of view, it explains the motivation of
developing the LRB scheduler.
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Fig. 2. Scheduler thresholds
C. Random Scheduler
If the sensor is not smart enough, it randomly selects a
measurement and transmits it to the tester. To investigate
this situation, we also consider a random scheduler for the
detection problem by letting
γi =
{
1, with a probability p;
0, with a probability 1− p, (12)
and the scheduling sequence γi is an i.i.d. process, which is
independent of sensor measurements.
In comparison with the random scheduler, γi of the LRB
scheduler is a deterministic function of the sensor measure-
ment yi. If yi is not transmitted by the sensor, the tester
deduces that a < yi < b, which can also be utilized to
improve the detection performance. Thus, it is expected that
the LRB scheduler may achieve a better detection performance
under the same scheduled transmission rate. We shall formally
confirm it in the sequel.
III. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS UNDER NORMAL
CONDITIONS
In this section, we focus on the LRB scheduler design under
secure communication channel, while the case under cyber
attacks is discussed in Section IV.
A. Neyman-Pearson Test
We explicitly establish an N-P test under the scheduled
communication in secure communication environment. To this
end, define a rejection region of the null hypothesis for the N-P
test as
R = {z : f(z|θ1) > kf(z|θ0)},
and an acceptance region of H0 in favor of H1 as
Rc = {z : f(z|θ1) < kf(z|θ0)},
where f(z|θ) is the joint pdf1 of z := {z1, . . . , zN} corre-
sponding to θ ∈ {θ0, θ1}.
It follows from Neyman-Pearson lemma [18] that the above
test is a uniformly most powerful (UMP) test. That is, if we
restrict to the class of all level α tests (control the probability
of Type I error as at most α), the N-P test would lead to
the smallest probability of Type II error. Note that a Type I
error (or error of the first kind) is the incorrect rejection of a
true null hypothesis, and the probability of the Type I error
is conceptually given by Pθ0(R). While a Type II error (or
error of the second kind) is the failure to reject a false null
hypothesis, and its probability is denoted by Pθ1(Rc).
1) N-P Test Under a LRB Scheduler: Under the LRB
scheduler (11), the information received by the tester at time
N is written as z = {z1, . . . , zN}, whose pdf is given by
f(z|θ) =
N∏
i=1
pθ(zi)
=
N∏
i=1
[
pT (yi|θ, σ2, a, b)
]γi
[Pθ{γi = 0}]1−γi ,(13)
where pT (·) is the function of the truncated Gaussian pdf that
lies within the set U = (−∞, a]∪ [b,∞), and is expressed as
pT (y|θ, σ2, a, b) = 1
σ
ϕ
(
y − θ
σ
)
·IU (y), (14)
where IU (y) is an indicator function, and ϕ(·) is the pdf of a
standard Gaussian random variable, i.e.,
ϕ(t) =
1√
2pi
exp(−t2/2);
IU (y) =
{
1, if y ∈ U,
0, else.
Then, the null hypothesis will be rejected if the following
condition is satisfied
N∏
i=1
(
pT (yi|θ1, σ2, a, b)
pT (yi|θ0, σ2, a, b)
)γi (Pθ1{γi = 0}
Pθ0{γi = 0}
)1−γi
> k (15)
where k ∈ R is to be designed to satisfy a given performance
requirement. To simplify the notation, let
Φ(x) =
∫ x
−∞
ϕ(t)dt;
z1(θ) =
a− θ
σ
, z2(θ) =
b− θ
σ
.
The probability of event {γi = 0} can be easily obtained as
Pθ{γi = 0} = Φ(z2(θ))− Φ(z1(θ)). (16)
1Strictly speaking, it is not very accurate to use the pdf of z due to that
the random vector z is evidently not continuous. To capture the essence of
our idea, we state the pdf of z throughout this paper rather than adopt the
probability measure.
5By (14) - (16), we shall reject H0 if
−(θ21 − θ20)
2σ2
·
N∑
i=1
γi +
(θ1 − θ0)
σ2
N∑
i=1
γiyi
> ln k + (N −
N∑
i=1
γi) ln
(
Φ(z2(θ0))− Φ(z1(θ0))
Φ(z2(θ1))− Φ(z1(θ1))
)
= ln k, (17)
where ln(·) is the natural logarithm function, and the second
term in the last inequality becomes zero.
2) N-P Test under a Random Scheduler: The joint pdf of
z = {z1, . . . , zN} with respect to θ under a random scheduler
(12) is given by
f(z|θ) =
N∏
i=1
pθ(zi) =
N∏
i=1
[
p · N (yi|θ, σ2)
]γi
[1− p]1−γi . (18)
Similarly, we shall reject H0 in favor of H1 if the following
condition is satisfied
−(θ21 − θ20)
2σ2
·
N∑
i=1
γi +
(θ1 − θ0)
σ2
N∑
i=1
γiyi > ln k. (19)
Remark 1. In light of (17) and (19), it is interesting that the
rejection conditions of both schedulers are of the same form.
This means that there is no need for the tester to know which
type of scheduler is used in the sensor node. Note that γi in
(17) is completely determined by yi while it is independent of
y in (19). This will result in different detection performance.
For the LRB scheduler in (8), it may not be possible to ex-
plicitly calculate the probabilities of Type I and II errors under
a given parameter k, although numerical algorithms can be
used. However, both probabilities will decrease exponentially
to zero as the number of sensor measurements tends to infinity.
In the sequel, we shall quantify this convergence speed.
B. Asymptotic Detection Performance
We design an optimal LRB scheduler in the sense of
achieving the fastest convergence of the probability of Type II
error under a scheduled transmission rate constraint, and that
the probability of Type I error is controlled below a certain
level. Note that it is impossible to simultaneously minimize
the probabilities of both Type I and II errors [18].
1) Relative Entropy and Stein’s Lemma: We recall the
Stein’s lemma [29] that the best error exponent for the
exponential convergence of the probability of Type II error
is determined by the relative entropy (Kullback-Leibler diver-
gence) from the null to alternative hypotheses.
Given two probability measures P1 and P0 over a set X ,
and P0 is absolutely continuous with respect to P1, the relative
entropy D from P0 to P1 is defined by
D(P0||P1) =
∫
X
ln
(
dP0
dP1
)
dP0, (20)
where dP0/dP1 is the Radon-Nikodym derivative [30] of P0
with respect to P1, provided that the expression on the right-
hand side of (20) exists. In fact, D(P0||P1) characterizes the
distance between two probability measures, which is a key
factor to deciding the asymptotic detection performance.
Lemma 1. (Stein’s lemma) Let X1, X2, . . . , Xn be an i.i.d.
random sequence under the probability measure Q over a set
X . Consider a binary hypothesis testing problem
H0 : Q = P0 versus H1 : Q = P1, (21)
where D(P0‖P1) < ∞. Let Rn ⊆ Xn be a rejection region
of the null hypothesis H0 obtained by the N-P test. Let the
probabilities of Type I and II errors be
αn = P
n
0 (Rn) and βn = Pn1 (Rcn), (22)
where
Pnj (·) = Pj × · · · × Pj(·)︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
,
is the product measure [30].
For 0 <  < 12 , define
βn = minRn⊆Xn,αn<
βn. (23)
Then it follows that
lim
n→∞
1
n
lnβn = −D(P0‖P1). (24)
Lemma 1 quantifies the asymptotic performance of the N-P
test. Specifically, if the probability of Type I error is controlled
to be less than , the number of samples required to guarantee
the probability of Type II error below a certain level δ < 1 is
approximately given by
n ≈ 1
D(P0‖P1) ln
(
1
δ
)
. (25)
To achieve a given detection performance, the relative en-
tropy thus can approximately evaluate the number of samples
required for discriminating between the null and alternative
hypotheses. The larger the relative entropy is, the smaller the
number of samples is required to discriminate the null and
alternative hypotheses by using the N-P test.
Hence it is sensible to maximize the relative entropy
D(P0||P1) to achieve an asymptotically optimal hypothesis
test in the sense of minimizing the probability of the Type
II error. We shall design the optimal LRB scheduler to
maximize the relative entropy from H0 to H1.
2) Optimal LRB Scheduler: In view of (11), the relative
entropy for the binary detection problem (2) is a function of
scheduling parameters a and b. Thus, we rewrite D(Pθ0‖Pθ1)
under the scheduler (11) as
L1(a, b) = D(Pθ0‖Pθ1). (26)
Definition 1. Given a scheduled transmission rate constraint,
i.e., Rθ 6 R, the optimal LRB scheduler for the N-P test is
solved by the following constrained optimization problem
maximize L1(a, b)
subject to Rθ 6 R, θ ∈ {θ0, θ1},
a+ b = θ0 + θ1, a 6 b.
6Note that Rθ is introduced in (4). Since yi is an i.i.d. random
sequence, it follows that γi is also i.i.d. This implies that Rθ =
Eθ[γ1] = Pθ{γ1 = 1}.
The following theorem gives an optimal LRB scheduler and
quantifies its asymptotic detection performance.
Theorem 1. Given a scheduled transmission rate constraint,
i.e., Rθ 6 R, the relative entropy from H0 to H1 under the
LRB scheduler (11) is given by
L1(a
∗, b∗) =
(θ21 − θ20)R
2σ2
− θ1 − θ0
σ2
×
∫
(−∞,a∗]∪[b∗,∞)
ypθ0(y)dy (27)
where the scheduling thresholds a∗ and b∗ satisfy that
Rθ0 = 1−
∫ b∗−θ0
σ
a∗−θ0
σ
ϕ(t)dt = R, (28)
Rθ1 = 1−
∫ b∗−θ1
σ
a∗−θ1
σ
ϕ(t)dt = R. (29)
Proof: See Appendix A.
Remark 2. For the conventional detection problem using the
full set of sensor measurements, which results in that R = 1,
it follows from Theorem 1 that a∗ = b∗. This implies that
L∗1 =
(θ21 − θ20)
2σ2
− θ1 − θ0
σ2
∫ ∞
−∞
ypθ0(y)dy
=
(θ1 − θ0)2
2σ2
.
(30)
3) Performance Analysis: Now, we evaluate the asymptotic
performance of the optimal LRB scheduler. Let us consider the
random scheduler in (12).
Lemma 2. Given a scheduled transmission rate constraint,
i.e., Rθ 6 R, the maximum relative entropy under the random
scheduler in (12) is given by
L2 = D(Pθ0‖Pθ1) =
(θ1 − θ0)2R
2σ2
. (31)
Proof: Recall that zi is an i.i.d. random sequence with
the pdf given by
pθ(z) =
[
p · N (y; θ, σ2)]γ [1− p]1−γ , (32)
where θ ∈ {θ0, θ1} and γ ∈ {0, 1}. Then, the relative entropy
of the two distributions from H0 to H1 under the random
scheduler is computed as follows
D(Pθ0‖Pθ1)
=
∫
{γ=1}
ln
pθ0(z)
pθ1(z)
dFθ0(z) +
∫
{γ=0}
ln
pθ0(z)
pθ1(z)
dFθ0(z)
= p ·
∫ ∞
−∞
pθ0(y)ln
pθ0(y)
pθ1(y)
dy + 0
=
(θ21 − θ20)p
2σ2
∫ ∞
−∞
pθ0(y)dy −
(θ1 − θ0)p
σ2
∫ ∞
−∞
ypθ0(y)dy
=
(θ1 − θ0)2p
2σ2
,
where Fθ(·) is the distribution function of random variable zi
under θ ∈ {θ0, θ1} and pθ(y) is the pdf of y with an abuse of
notation.
Consider the scheduled transmission rate constraint, we
obtain that
Rθ = p 6 R, (33)
which establishes the desired result.
In the following result, we prove that the LRB scheduler
strictly improves the random scheduler.
Theorem 2. Under the same scheduled transmission rate
constraint, i.e., Rθ 6 R, the optimal LRB scheduler achieves
a strictly better asymptotic N-P testing performance than the
random scheduler if 0 < R < 1, i.e.,
L1(a
∗, b∗) > L2
where L1(a∗, b∗) and L2 are given in Theorem 1 and Lemma
2, respectively.
Proof: Under a scheduled transmission rate constraint
R < 1 and for any pair of a∗ and b∗ satisfying (28) and
(29), it follows from Theorem 1 and Lemma 2 that
L1(a
∗, b∗)− L2
=
(θ1 − θ0)R
σ2
·
∫ ∞
−∞
ypθ0(y)dy
− (θ1 − θ0)
σ2
∫
(−∞,a∗]∪[b∗,∞)
ypθ0(y)dy
=
θ1 − θ0
σ2
(∫ b∗
a∗
ypθ0(y)dy − (1−R)
∫ ∞
−∞
ypθ0(y)dy
)
=
θ1 − θ0
σ2
(∫ b∗
a∗
ypθ0(y)dy − (1−R)θ0
)
.
Note that a∗ + b∗ = θ0 + θ1 and b∗ > a∗, we obtain that
θ0 − b∗ < −|a∗ − θ0|.
This further implies that∫ b∗
a∗
ypθ0(y)dy − (1−R)θ0
=
∫ b∗
a∗
(y − θ0)pθ0(y)dy + θ0
∫ b∗
a∗
pθ0(y)dy − (1−R)θ0
= σ
∫ b∗−θ0
σ
θ0−b∗
σ
tϕ(t)dt− σ
∫ a∗−θ0
σ
θ0−b∗
σ
tϕ(t)dt
> 0− σ
∫ |a∗−θ0|
σ
− |a∗−θ0|σ
tϕ(t)dt
= 0.
Since θ1 > θ0, it is obvious that L1(a∗, b∗)−L2 > 0, which
completes the proof.
Example 1. We provide a graphical view in Fig. 3 to compare
the error exponents (relative entropy) for the two schedulers
under different scheduled transmission rate constraints by
setting θ0 = 0, θ1 = 1, and σ2 = 1. For the random scheduler,
the error exponent grows linearly with respect to the scheduled
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Fig. 3. Comparison of error exponents of the LRB scheduling strategy
and random scheduling strategy under different scheduled transmission rate
constraints.
transmission rate. For the LRB scheduler, however, we observe
a faster increase of error exponent when transmission rate is
lower than 0.4. It is also noteworthy that when only 70% of
sensor measurements are sent, the detection performance of
the LBR scheduler is only 2.1% worse than the standard N-
P test using the full set of measurements. This suggests that
the use of the scheduler with the form of (11) is an effective
method for maintaining a good detection performance when
the scheduled transmission rate is limited.
IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS UNDER CYBER ATTACKS
Till now, we have considered the problem of networked
detection problem via the Neyman-Pearson approach, where
the communication channel is assumed secure. In this section,
we studied the same problem over non-secure channels. In
particular, the deceptive signals from the intruder are injected
into the channel and arrive at the tester together with the true
measurements. Then, if the sensor measurement yi is directly
sent, it is impossible for the tester to distinguish the true
measurement from the deceptive signal.
Observe that the binary state γi of the LRB scheduler can
usually be securely encrypted, and successfully transmitted to
the tester. We shall explore this information to retrieve some
sensor measurements for accomplishing the detection task.
To this purpose, we first propose a measurement discriminate
protocol and then evaluate the error component for detection
under different attack intensities.
A. Measurement Discrimination
Recall the LRB scheduler in (11). If a packet with the
message that γi = 0 arrives, it can be deduced by the tester that
yi ∈ (a, b) and no sensor measurements shall be sent. When
the message γi = 1 comes, the tester is informed that a true
sensor measurement should satisfy that yi ∈ (−∞, a]∪ [b,∞).
Thus, we are able to design the following signal processing
protocol for the tester to retrieve some sensor measurements
while all the deceptive measurements are discarded.
• When γi = 0 is observed by the tester, discard all the
received measurements (if there is any).
• When γi = 1 is observed by the tester and there is only
one measurement in the range (−∞, a] ∪ [b,∞), then
select it as the true sensor measurement yi. Otherwise,
discard all the received data.
The first rule is obvious. Arrival of γi = 0 indicates that
no sensor measurement is sent from sensors. Thus, all the
received data are deceptive data and discarded. γi = 1 suggests
that a useful sensor measurement yi ∈ (−∞, a]∪ [b,∞) must
have been transmitted to the tester. However, the tester may
also receive a deceptive signal qi. If qi /∈ (−∞, a] ∪ [b,∞),
the tester can correctly identify the true measurement yi. If
qi ∈ (−∞, a]∪ [b,∞), the tester has to discard all the received
data since it is impossible to distinguish between qi and yi.
If there is no scheduler in (11), the tester can not distinguish
between yi and qi at every sampling time, and thus fails
to complete the detection task. From this point of view, the
scheduler helps to against this type of cyber attacks. Obviously,
the detection performance degrades when deceptive signals
come more frequently. To formalize it, let a binary variable
ζi to denote whether the attacker injects a deceptive signal to
the channel, e.g., ζi = 1 means that there is a deceptive signal
qi in the channel, otherwise ζi = 0. Thus, attack intensity
Pi := Pr{ζi = 1} reflects the frequency of attacking the
networked system. We further assume that the deceptive signal
{qi} forms an i.i.d. sequence, and let
η = 1− Pi · Pr{qi ∈ (−∞, a] ∪ [b,∞)} (34)
Under the above discrimination scheme, each transmitted
sensor measurement will be affected by cyber attacks with
probability 1− η. In the rest of this section, we shall quantify
the effect of cyber attacks on the detection performance by η.
B. Performance Analysis
The sensor information accessed by the tester at time N is
denoted by w = {w1, . . . , wN}, whose pdf is given by
f(w|θ) =
N∏
i=1
pθ(wi)
=
N∏
i=1
{[
η · pT (yi|θ, σ2, a, b)
]δi
(1− η)1−δi
}γi
·[Pθ{γi = 0}]1−γi , (35)
where δi is a binary random variable. It is one if the trans-
mitted measurement yi is correctly identified by the tester and
δi = 0 otherwise.
By a similar derivation in (14)-(16), we shall reject H0 in
favor of H1 when the following condition is met.
−(θ21 − θ20)
2σ2
·
N∑
i=1
δi · γi+ (θ1 − θ0)
σ2
N∑
i=1
δi · γiyi > ln k. (36)
Remark 3. It is noteworthy that δi equals to one if there is
no cyber attack. The rejection region in (36) is then reduced
to the one in (17). This suggests that the proposed detection
framework is more general and can perform robustly under
non-secure channels.
The following theorem quantifies the influence of cyber
attacks on the detection performance under different attack
intensities.
8Theorem 3. Under the LRB scheduler in (11) with cyber
attacks, the relative entropy for detection is given by
D(Pθ0(w)||Pθ1(w)) = η ·D(Pθ0(z)||Pθ1(z)), (37)
where D(Pθ0(z)||Pθ1(z)) denotes the relative entropy under
secure channel and is given in (26), and η is defined in (34).
Proof: Recall that wi is an i.i.d. random sequence with
the pdf given by
pθ(w) =
{[
ηpT (y|θ, σ2, a, b)
]δ
(1− η)1−δ
}γ
[Pθ{γ = 0}]1−γ
where θ ∈ {θ0, θ1} and δ, γ ∈ {0, 1}. The relative entropy of
the two distributions fromH0 toH1 under the sensor scheduler
and the proposed measurement discrimination over non-secure
channels is computed as follows
D(Pθ0(w)||Pθ1(w))
=
∫
{γ=1}
ln
pθ0(w)
pθ1(w)
dFθ0(w) +
∫
{γ=0}
ln
pθ0(w)
pθ1(w)
dFθ0(w)
=
∫
{γ=0}
ln
pθ0(w)
pθ1(w)
dFθ0(w) +
∫
{γ=1,δ=1}
ln
pθ0(w)
pθ1(w)
dFθ0(w)
+
∫
{γ=1,δ=0}
ln
pθ0(w)
pθ1(w)
dFθ0(w)
=
∫
{γ=1}
η · pT (y|θ0, σ, a, b) ln pT (y|θ0, σ, a, b)
pT (y|θ1, σ, a, b)dy + 0
+ Pθ0{γ = 0} · ln
Pθ0{γ = 0}
Pθ1{γ = 0}
= η ·
∫
(−∞,a]∪[b,∞)
pθ0(y) ln
exp[−(y − θ0)2/2σ2]
exp[−(y − θ1)2/2σ2]
dy
+ Pθ0{γ = 0} · ln
Pθ0{γ = 0}
Pθ1{γ = 0}
= −η(θ1 − θ0)
σ2
(∫ a
−∞
ypθ0(y)dy +
∫ ∞
b
ypθ0(y)dy
)
+
η(θ21 − θ20)
2σ2
Pθ0{γ = 1}+ Pθ0{γ = 0} · ln
Pθ0{γ = 0}
Pθ1{γ = 0}
From (10), we obtain that
Pθ0{γ = 0} =
∫ b−θ0
σ
a−θ0
σ
ϕ(t)dt =
∫ θ1−a
σ
θ1−b
σ
ϕ(t)dt
=
∫ θ1−b
σ
θ1−a
σ
ϕ(−t)d(−t) =
∫ b−θ1
σ
a−θ1
σ
ϕ(t)dt
= Pθ1{γ = 0}.
It follows that
D(Pθ0(w)||Pθ1(w))
= −η(θ1 − θ0)
σ2
(∫ a
−∞
ypθ0(y)dy +
∫ ∞
b
ypθ0(y)dy
)
+
η(θ21 − θ20)
2σ2
Pθ0{γ = 1}
= η ·D(Pθ0(z)||Pθ1(z)),
(38)
which completes the proof.
By Lemma 1, an optimal LRB scheduler for detection
should be designed to maximize the relative entropy from H0
toH1. Clearly, D(Pθ0(z)||Pθ1(z)) increases in a but decreases
in b. However, increasing a will decrease the robustness of the
LRB scheduler against cyber attacks, which is obvious by (34)
and Theorem 3. Note that the role of the parameter b is similar
to the parameter a. Together with Theorem 3, the optimal LRB
scheduler for detection under cyber attacks can be defined.
Definition 2. Under cyber attacks, the optimal LRB scheduler
in (11) for the N-P test is solved by the following constrained
optimization problem
maximize η ·D(Pθ0(z)||Pθ1(z))
subject to Rθ 6 R, θ ∈ {θ0, θ1},
a+ b = θ0 + θ1, a 6 b.
In view of the definition of η in (34), solving the above
optimization problem requires the distribution of attack signal
qi, which however is generally unknown to the design of the
LRB scheduler. Note that a typical detection system usually
works under system state H0 : {θ = θ0} in the majority of
time. An intelligent attacker is likely to fabricate a false alarm
in the system by sending deceptive signals generated from
distribution Pθ1 according to the alternative state H1 : {θ =
θ1}, i.e., qi ∼ Pθ1 .
Under this case, we provide a graphical view in Fig. 4 to
illustrate how the error exponent (relative entropy) in Theorem
3 changes under different attack intensities. Particularly, let
θ0 = 0, θ1 = 1, and σ2 = 1 whereas the attack intensity
varies from 0.1 to 1.0. The case when no attack happens (i.e.,
Pi = 0) is also depicted for comparison.
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Fig. 4. Comparison of error exponents for detection under different attack
intensities and different scheduled transmission rate constraints.
By Fig. 4, it is apparent that a higher attack intensity results
in a smaller error component, which is certainly consistent
with the intuition as more deceptive signals will be received
by the tester. It is interesting that the LRB scheduler with
a lower scheduled transmission rate is more robust to cyber
attacks. For example, when the rate is less than 0.3, the
error exponents under different attack intensities are close.
9An instant explanation is that only a small portion of sensor
measurements will be attacked by the deceptive signals.
The advantage of using the LRB scheduler becomes signif-
icant for a relatively large attack intensity (Pi ≥ 0.5). Without
the LRB scheduler, which corresponds to that the scheduled
transmission rate is equal to one, the error components do
not always attain their maximum at R = 1. To get the best
detection performance (e.g., the maximum error component),
we have to resort to an effective LRB scheduler for the case
that Pi ≥ 0.5.
Under the extreme case (Pi = 1.0), the error component
even goes to zero as the scheduled transmission rate ap-
proaches one. This implies that without the LRB scheduler,
the detection task can not be completed for the large attack
intensity. In fact, without a LRB scheduler, every sensor
measurement will be corrupted and can not be distinguished
from the deceptive signals. Thus, all the sensor measurements
will be discarded, leading to the failure of discriminating the
system state. This clearly explains the motivation for designing
a LRB communication scheduler in the sensor side.
V. SIMULATION
In this section, the theoretical results will be validated
respectively via simulations.
A deterministic signal in Gaussian noise is given by:
yi = θ + vi, i = 1, 2, . . . , (39)
where θ ∈ R is an unknown parameter for hypothesis testing,
and vi is a white Gaussian noise with variance σ2 = 1.
Consider a hypothesis testing problem as follows:
H0 : {θ = 0} versus H1 : {θ = θ1}. (40)
Obviously, the testing problem in this case is a signal
detection problem, i.e. detecting the presence or absence of
a deterministic signal in Gaussian enviornment. Accordingly,
the signal to noise ratio (SNR) is given by
SNR = 10 log10
(
θ21
σ2
)
[dB]. (41)
Low observation SNR of −3 dB, medium observation SNR
of 0 dB and high observation SNR of 3 dB are adopted in the
numerical test.
The simulation is conducted from two aspects. Firstly, we
verify the testing performance of the N-P test in Section III
under the LRB scheduler with different communication con-
straints. For comparison, a random scheduler and an optimal
N-P tester with the full set of measurements are considered.
Secondly, we test the detection performance of the N-P test in
Section IV under the scheduler at the sensor and the receiving
protocols at the tester when false data injection attack happens.
Simulations are conducted under different transmission rates
and attack intensities to show the robustness of the system in
different scenarios.
A. Detection Performance Without Cyber Attacks
In this subsection, we check the testing performance of the
scheduler based N-P test from the Neyman-Pearson approach,
where we fix the probability of Type I error at α = 0.05 and
numerically compute the probability of Type II error using the
Monte Carlo method. The channel is assumed to be secure,
and the rejection condition of the null hypothesis is given by
(17) and (19). Here we take a two-step procedure to perform
the simulation.
In the first step, we determine the parameter k to satisfy that
the probability of Type I error is controlled to below α = 0.05
under different sizes of sensor measurements, and scheduled
transmission rate constraints. Given a scheduled transmission
rate constraint R, define
TN :=
−(θ21 − θ20)
2σ2
·
N∑
i=1
γi +
(θ1 − θ0)
σ2
N∑
i=1
γiyi
= TN−1 −
(
θ21
2
γN − θ1γNyN
)
, (42)
where γi is given in (11) and Theorem 1. For each N , we
independently generated S = 5000 samples from a Gaussian
random variable under H0. Then, we recursively obtain a
data set with size S for each N , i.e. TN = {T iN}Si=1 using
(42), from which an empirical distribution of TN can be
obtained, and denoted as FN (·, ω) with ω ∈ Ω. By the
Glivenko-Cantelli theorem [31], it is known that the empirical
distribution converges almost surely to the true distribution
of TN . This means that FN (·, ω) is a good approximation of
the true distribution of TN . Then, the corresponding testing
parameter k for each N is selected as
kN = exp(inf
x
{x|FN (x, ω) > 1− α}).
In the second step, the parameters determined above are
used to compute the probability of Type II error. Similarly, we
independently generated S = 5000 samples from a Gaussian
random variable under H1, and recursively obtain a data set
TN with size S for each N . By the N-P test, we count the
number of samples that accept H0, and the probability of Type
II error is approximately given by the ratio of the total number
of samples accepting H0 to S, i.e.
βN =
#{i|T iN accepts H0, 1 6 i 6 S}
S
,
where #A denotes the cardinality of set A.
Fig. 5 illustrates the numerically computed probability of
Type II error under a scheduled transmission rate constraint
Rθ 6 0.5 while Fig. 6 shows the result under a scheduled
transmission rate constraint Rθ 6 0.1. It is observed from Fig.
5 that the probability of Type II error under the LRB scheduler
comes close to the standard N-P test using the full set of
measurements, and they are indistinguishable for a reasonable
size of sensor measurements. Under both scheduled commu-
nication rate constrains, it is evident that the probability of
Type II error of the LRB scheduler is smaller than the random
scheduler. This numerically demonstrates the effectiveness of
the LRB scheduler, and supports our theoretical results.
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Fig. 5. Comparison of probability of Type II error under communication constraint Rθ 6 0.5 in secure channel
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Fig. 6. Comparison of probability of Type II error under communication constraint Rθ 6 0.1 in secure channel
B. Detection Performance Under Cyber Attacks
In this subsection, we examine the detection performance of
N-P test when deceptive signals are injected into the channel.
Similar to the previous subsection, the probability of Type
I error is fixed at α = 0.05 and the probability of Type II
error is obtained via the two-step Monte Carlo method with a
modification on the testing statistic TN as follows.
T ′N :=
−(θ21 − θ20)
2σ2
·
N∑
i=1
δi · γi + (θ1 − θ0)
σ2
N∑
i=1
δi · γiyi
= T ′N−1 −
(
θ21
2
δNγN − θ1δNγNyN
)
. (43)
The deceptive signals are assumed to be generated from
distribution Pθ1 according to the alternative hypothesis H1 :
{θ = θ1} to fabricate a false alarm in the system. The SNR is
fixed at 0 dB. Low attack intensity of Pi = 0.1, medium attack
intensity of Pi = 0.5 and high attack intensity of Pi = 1.0 are
considered in the simulation.
Fig. 7 depicts the numerically computed probability of
Type II error when the system is being affected by cyber
attacks. The detection performance under low, medium and
high attack intensities are given by Fig. 7 (a), (b), and (c)
respectively. For a certain attack intensity, testing results
under different levels of transmission rate constraints, e.g.,
R ∈ {0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9, 1.0} are illustrated in the figure.
It is clear from Fig 7 (a) that a higher communication rate
generally results in better detection performance under low
attack intensities. For the medium and high attack intensities
given in Fig. 7 (b) and (c), however, the result is quite different.
The best detection performance is obtained at R = 0.5 and
R = 0.3 when the system is suffering cyber attacks with
intensities Pi = 0.5 and Pi = 1.0 respectively. When the
transmission rate approaches to 1, the testing performance
deteriorates significantly. At high attack intensity (Pi = 1.0),
transmitting 90% sensor measurements doesn’t achieves a
comparable performance to the case with merely 10% mea-
surements are transmitted. This scenario can be explained by
the fact that a large portion of transmitted measurement are
discarded at the tester since true sensor measurements become
less and less discriminative among deceptive signals when the
transmission rate increases.
VI. CONCLUSION
Due to communication constraints and possible cyber at-
tacks of a non-secure network, we have proposed a LRB
scheduler for the binary detection problem. The challenge
of this testing framework lies in the nonlinearity of the
scheduler. Asymptotic analysis results demonstrate that the
LRB scheduler for a secure network shares a comparable
detection performance to the standard one using the full set of
sensor measurements, even under a moderate communication
cost. Meanwhile, it achieves a strictly better exponent of Type
II probability of error than the random scheduler. Under cyber
attacks by injecting deceptive signals to the network, the LRB
scheduler can also maintain its detection functionality. The
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Fig. 7. Comparison of probability of Type II error under different attack intensities.
degradation of detection performance under different attack
intensities was exactly quantified by means of asymptotic
analysis.
Our future work is to extend the idea of the LRB scheduler
to the multiple hypotheses case, i.e., θ ∈ {θ0, . . . , θM−1} and
M > 2. However, this entails a new challenge in selecting
informative measurements, and conducting the asymptotic
analysis. Another important future research is to study the vec-
tor measurement. There are two possible approaches for this
generalization. One is to sequentially decide the transmission
of each element of the measurement vector. The other is to
compress the measurement vector into one dimensional scalar.
Although these extensions will be interesting, they are beyond
the scope of this paper and left to our future work.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Proof: Recall that zi is an i.i.d. random sequence with the
pdf given by
pθ(z) = [pT (y|θ, σ, a, b)]γ [Pθ{γ = 0}]1−γ ,
where θ ∈ {θ0, θ1} and γ ∈ {0, 1}. The relative entropy of the
two distributions from H0 to H1 under the LRB scheduling
scheduler is computed as follows
D(Pθ0‖Pθ1)
=
∫
{γ=1}
ln
pθ0(z)
pθ1(z)
dFθ0(z) +
∫
{γ=0}
ln
pθ0(z)
pθ1(z)
dFθ0(z)
=
∫
{γ=1}
pT (y|θ0, σ, a, b) ln pT (y|θ0, σ, a, b)
pT (y|θ1, σ, a, b)dy
+
∫
{γ=0}
ln
Pθ0{γ = 0}
Pθ1{γ = 0}
dFθ0(y)
=
∫
(−∞,a]∪[b,∞)
pθ0(y) ln
exp[−(y − θ0)2/2σ2]
exp[−(y − θ1)2/2σ2]
dy
+ ln
Pθ0{γ = 0}
Pθ1{γ = 0}
·
∫ b
a
pθ0(y)dy
=
Pθ0{γ = 1} · (θ21 − θ20)
2σ2
+ Pθ0{γ = 0} · ln
Pθ0{γ = 0}
Pθ1{γ = 0}
− θ1 − θ0
σ2
(∫
(−∞,a]∪[b,∞)
ypθ0(y)dy
)
.
From (10), we obtain
Pθ0{γ = 0} =
∫ b−θ0
σ
a−θ0
σ
ϕ(t)dt =
∫ θ1−a
σ
θ1−b
σ
ϕ(t)dt
=
∫ θ1−b
σ
θ1−a
σ
ϕ(−t)d(−t) =
∫ b−θ1
σ
a−θ1
σ
ϕ(t)dt
= Pθ1{γ = 0}.
(44)
Then, it follows that
L1(a, b) = D(Pθ0‖Pθ1)
= −θ1 − θ0
σ2
(∫ a
−∞
ypθ0(y)dy +
∫ ∞
b
ypθ0(y)dy
)
+
(θ21 − θ20)
2σ2
Pθ0{γ = 1}.
(45)
Note that a+ b = θ0 + θ1 and b > a, we obtain
|b− θ0| > |a− θ0|.
Therefore, it yields that
∂L1(a, b)
∂a
= −θ1 − θ0
σ2
(apθ0(a) + bpθ0(b))
+
(θ21 − θ20)
2σ2
(pθ0(a) + pθ0(b))
=
(θ1 − θ0)(b− a)
2σ2
· (pθ0(a)− pθ0(b))
=
(θ1 − θ0)(b− a)
2σ3
·
(
ϕ
(
a− θ0
σ
)
− ϕ
(
b− θ0
σ
))
> 0,
(46)
which implies that L1(a, b) is an increasing function of a.
Considering the constraints of the problem Rθ 6 R, it
follows that a 6 a∗. Therefore, L1(a, b) is maximized when
a = a∗ and b = b∗.
By (45), we obtain that:
L1(a
∗, b∗) =
(θ21 − θ20)R
2σ2
− θ1 − θ0
σ2
×
∫
(−∞,a∗]∪[b∗,∞)
ypθ0(y)dy.
The proof is completed.
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